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A. VIEW OF THE PAROL-EVIDENCE RULE.-
PART II.
§ 7. Integration by Requirement of Law. The process of
Integration, from which it results that the terms of a particular
transaction are to be sought only in a written memorial, is one
dependent usually upon the intent of the parties. If they
have willed that a certain writing shall exclusively be and rep-
resent their act, then the court will so treat it; if they have
not so willed, then the court will resort to any negotiations
that may have occurred, and to any dealings, whether oral or
written, to ascertain and piece together the total of terms of
the act. But there is another case in which the court may
decline to consider sundry acts and dealings as furnishing the
terms of a legal act, and may confine itself solely to a single
written memorial; and that is where by provision of law the
act is to be valid only when it is transacted in the shape of a
single wiitten memorial. When the law has provided that the
only way in which an act may be given legal significance or
existence is by doing it, and all of it, in writing, then no other
conduct or dealings, purporting to be such an act, can be
considered, and evidence of them is, of course, inadmissible
because tending to prove an immaterial factum probandum.
The difference between the effect of non-integration of this sort
and of the preceding sort is that, in the former case (integra-
tion by intent of the parties), resort to parol' transactions is
forbidden only when the parties have by intention made the
single writing the exclusive memorial; and if they have not,
then resort may be had to parol transactions if any occurred;
while in the latter case (integration by requirement of law)
resort to parol transactions is absolutely forbidden,2 so that if
the act has not been integrated in writing as required, a trans-
I By "parol," in connection with the present principle is properly meant,
not merely oral utterances, but also informal writings, i. e.,writings (letters,
memoranda, etc.) other than the single and final written memorial; see
ante, I.
There is one apparent exception, to be noted later.
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action in parol will still be of no significance for the purpose
in hand.
The cases in which, by requirement of law, there must be
an integration in writing, are of two general sorts: (i) certain
acts by ordinary persons, creating, transferring, and extin-
guishing rights and obligations; (2) proceedings by judicial
and other officers.
(i) In only a few instances does a requirement of law pre-
scribe that an act, to be valid, must be reduced to writing; the
genius of our law being contrary to that of the Continental
law in this respect. Almost universally such a requirement
is made for wills of realty;' in most jurisdictions the require-
ment extends to wills of personalty also; in probably all
jurisdictions an exception exists for oral (nuncupative) wills
by soldiers and sailors in service, and, sometimes, by persons
on a deathbed or during a journey In most jurisdictions,
also, grants of realty are required to be reduced wholly to
writing. The requirement of a memorandum of certain data
in a transaction of sale, provided for in the fourth and seven-
teenth sections of the Statute of Frauds, is to be distinguished
from a requirement of the above sort; that which the statute
requires is merely an accompanying or collateral written
memorandum of some parts of the transaction ;S it thus differs
in the two important respects that an oral contract of sale may
exist independently of the memorandum' (whereas the written
will, and nothing else, is the testamentary act), and that only
certain parts of the transaction need be noted in the momo-
randum (whereas the written will must contain every part of
the testamentary act).
(2) It has long been a principle of our law, irrespective of
any statutory requirement, that the proceedings of a court exist
and are to be found only in the i record." Precisely what the
"record" is has been the subject of many detailed rulings and
See Jarman on Wills, 6 Am. ed. 76.
2 See Jarman, ubi supra, 784.
3 See Browne, Statute of Frauds, cc. 17, 18.
4 So that, for example, the memorandum may be made after the actual
contract of sale.
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much statutory regulation; but the general notion conceives;
it as the final enrolment or written expansion of all the pro-
ceedifigs in a litigation, made by the clerk or the judge, and
verified by the judge.' This " record" is, in legal theory,
not a testimonial report by the officer of the proceedings, nor
a copy of some other written act; it is the proceeding and the
act itself. Nothing that is not in this record is a legal act or
a part of the proceedings ; what is not in the record has not
been done; and, consequently, it cannot be shown that some-
thing was done which is not noted in the record, or that a
thing noted in the record was in truth done differently. The
principle applies, of course, only to such proceedings as prop-
erly form a component part of the proceedings; and hence
transactions not properly forming a part of the record may be
shown otherwise than by the record; and there is much learn-
ing as to the discriminations here necessary to be taken.
Moreover, though in legal theory the record is the proceeding
itself, nevertheless it is usually not prepared till an interval of
time has elapsed after the actual oral proceeding, and in the
meantime the clerk or the judge has, in a docket or a minute-
book, made a temporary note of the various things done.
'Thus a question may arise as to the propriety of using the
-minutes to correct the record; s though even when this is
allowed, the record is still in legal theory the proceeding itself,
and stands effective until formally corrected. Thus, again,
resort may be had to the minutes as representing and consti-
tuting the proceeding, where the record proper has been lost
or destroyed or has never been made up ; ' and here occurs the
I See the nature and policy of the doctrine expounded in Pruden v.
Alden, 23 Pick. x84; Ward v. Saunders, 6 Ired. 382; Wells v. Stevens,
2 Gray, 115.
2 "The record is tried by inspection; and if the judgment does not
there appear, the conclusion of law is that none was rendered:" Nisbet,
J., in Bryant v. Owen, i Ga. 355, 367.
3 By making an entry nuncpro tunc; see Jacks v. Adamson, 56 Oh.
397; State v. Feister (Or.), 5o Pac. 56z.
' Until they can be made up, the short notes must stand as the
record: " Pruden v. Alden, 23 Pick. 184; "Minutes may be introduced
as . . . in truth for the time being constituting the xecord itself:"
McGrath v. Seagrave, 2 All. 443- Where the final record is lost, the
minutes take its place: Cook v. Wood, r McCord, 139.
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peculiar difference' between this kind of integration by law and
the preceding kind; for in the case, for example, of a will, if
no will in writing exists, no oral or other informal attempt at
a will may take its place; while, if a record has not been made
up, the provisional minute-book or docket is treated as repre-
senting the proceeding.
There are but few other official proceedings, which are
treated, after the analogy of judicial records, as constituted
solely in and by the official writing. The principle is some-
times applied to the records of a public corporation ; 2 and is
usually applied to the journals of a legislature. The acknowl-
edgment by a married woman that she signs a deed of her own
free will is in many jurisdictions treated as a judicial proceed-
ing, and the official certificate can thus not be shown to be
incorrect; but other views have often (sometimes by express
statute) prevailed.3  The registration of a deed is usually re-
garded as merely the preservation of an official copy of the
original and effective document;' but, perhaps, under the
recent improved systems of transfer the official registry may
be treated on the principles of judicial records.' To be distin-
guished from the principles applicable to judicial records" is a
principle not infrequently treated as equivalent, by which an
I See note, ante.
2 See Saxton v. Ninnus, 14 Mass. 315; Thayer v. Stearns, x Pick. iog;
Roland v. District, x61 Pa. 102, io6. But there is sometimes a difference,
in that oral proceedings can be shown if no record was made: Boggs v.
Ass'n, iii Cal. 354; Zalesky v. Ins. Co., 102 Ia. 512; Contra, Taylor v.
Henry, 2 Pick. 397.
3 One view is that the certificate is conclusive except as to appearance
or jurisdiction in general; another, that it is impeachable only for fraud
or, perhaps, for mistake; another, that it may be contradicted on any
point; see the various views represented in Elliott v. Peirsol, 1 Pet. 328;
Edinb. R. L. M. Co. v. Peoples, 102 Ala. 241; Woodhead v. Foulds, 7
Bush, 222; Dodge v. Hollinshead, 6 Minn. 25,39; Davis v. Howard, 172
Ill. 340; Harkins v. Forsyth, ii Leigh, 294.
' See Harvey v. Thorpe, 28 Ala. 250; Gaston v. Merriam, 33 Minn. 271;
Fleming v. Parry, 24 Pa. 47; Hastings v. B. H. T. Co., 9 Pick. 8o; Ames
v. Phelps. 18 Pick. 314; Jones, Real Property, 1475; so also as to its
non-conclusiveness in regard to the time of recording: Bartlett v. Boyd,
34 Vt. 256; Horsley v. Garth, 2 Gratt. 371, 391.
5 See articles in 6 Harv. L. Rev. 302, 369, 410; 7 id. 24.
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official's report or certificate of an act done before him by a
person wishing to do a legal act is treated as conclusive testi-
mony to the nature of the act done.* There are but few
well-established instances of this; the chief one being the
magistrate's report, as required by many statutes, of the state-
ment of an accused person examined before him; 1 here the
real process seems to be the making of a specific witness' tes-
timony conclusive?
§ 8. Paral-Evidence Rde applicable only between the Parties.
It is usually said that the parol-evidence rule is applicable
only between the parties. That this is correct, for many pur-
poses at least, may be seen by noticing the principle of the
rule so far as the integration was made by intent of the par-
ties. Their determination is that, for the purposes of consti-
1 There are many other instances in which such a conclusive effect has
been claimed but usually denied for an official certificate; for example,
to a registration of birth (Hermann v. State, 73 Wis. 248) ; to an enrol-
ment of recruits by a military officer (Wilson v. McClure, 50 111. 366) ; to
a notarial certificate (Wood v. Trust Co., 7 How. (Miss.) 3o9, 630; M errill
V. Sypert (Ark.), 44 S. W. 462); to the'certificate of an oath-taking, or
jurat (see R. v. Emden, 9 East, 437; Thurston v. Slatford, i Salk. 284;
Sherman v. Needham, 4 Pick. 66).
3The feature superficially common to both principles is that it is for-
bidden to show that the thing was done other than as stated in the docu-
ment. But the reasons for this identical result are not the same in both
cases. In the case of a judicial record, the record is the proceeding;
consequently nothing else may be consulted as constituting the proceed-
ing. In the case of an official's report, the effective legal act is still what
was done or said before him; and his writing is no more than a reporting
or-testifying to that act of another person ; it is a preferred report and is
conclusive, but it is still only a report. The practical difference is that,
in the case of a magistrate's report, if it is for any reason not available
(by loss or destruction, for example), it is sufficient to prove directly the
oral statements of the accused by one who heard them, on the theory
that when a preferred witness is unavailable, an ordinary witness will
suffice; while in the case of a judicial record, if the record itself was
never made, then the proceeding cannot be proved at all (as well ex-
pounded by Hubbard, J., in Sayles v. Briggs, 4 Mete. 421), and if it was
made but is lost, then the proof would be, not of the oral doings, but of
the record's contents (Mandeville v. Reynolds, 68 N. Y. 528, 533) ; and
where by statute the resort to oral doings is allowable in order to restore
lost records, it is in legal theory, not the substitution of one kind of
testimony for another, but the re-constitution, by compilation, of the
judicial act itself.
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tuting a certain legal act of theirs, a particular writing shall
alone be consulted; but, so far as concerns their relations to
other persons, their conduct and utterances extrinsic to that
writing may still be considered, so far as such data are not
treated as part of that act but become material for some other
purpose. For example, where the issue is as to adverse pos-
session of a right of way, the deed not reserving such a right,
a conversation between grantor and grantee, the former con-
ceding the way, would be receivable as affecting the adverse
nature of the grantee's possession; I so also a creditor, claim-
ing to set aside a mortgage as fraudulent, could show, as
evidence of fraud, the debtor's oral agreement with the mort-
gage e; 2 so, also, in a criminal prosecution for embezzlement,
in which the intent is the material issue, an-oral promise by
the employer to allow certain sums to the employe, could be.
shown, in spite of the terms of the written contract between
them.3 Where the integration is required by law, the same
consequence may follow; thus, on an issue as to the contents
of i lost will or of undue influence, the testator's normal tes-
tamentary intentions being admissible in evidence, oral state-
ments of intention, or a will not duly executed, or a will not
proved by the attesting witnesses,' could be used as showing
the testamentary intention; since here there is no attempt to
use the utterances as having testamentary effectiveness. The
truth seems to be, then, that the rule, as regards others than
the parties to the act, does not exclude extrinsic utterances so
far as they are for any purpose admissible; but that even for
other parties, it would still apply to exclude, where the object
was to show the terms of the act as the effective transaction
between the parties. Nevertheless, it is. common to say,
without qualification, that the rule applies only in suits
between the parties.'
1 I Ashley v. Ashley, 4 Gray, 197.
'Jewett v. Sundback, 5 S. D. iii, ixg.
SValker v. State (Ala.), 23 So. 149; compare Re Clapton, 3 Cox
Cr. 126.
4 Demombreun v. Walker, 4 Baxt. 199.
5 For other instances, see Dunn v. Price, 112 Cal. 46; Roof v. Pulley
Co., 36 Fla. 284; Kellogg v. Tompson, r42 Mass. 76; Plainfield F. N. B'k
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§ 9. (II) Interpretation of Legal Acts. Assuming that a
legal- act has been consummated (whether it has or has not
been integrated), a peculiar situation and a new set of ques-
tions are presented when the act comes before the courts for
enforcement. The process of realizing, enforcing, or giving
objective effectiveness to ihe party's act involves the applica-
tion of the terms of the act to external objects so as to carry
out and make good, by process of law, the results prescribed
by the act. Assuming that there is no legal objection to this
realization of the act, then the sole aim of the court is to as-
certain the significance of its terms, or, in other words, the
associations or connections between the terms of the act and
the various possible objects of the external world. The pro-
cess of fulfilling this aim is the process of Interpretation. In
order to understand the questions which it presents, two fun-
damental distinctions must be noticed at the outset: (I) the
distinction between the intention of the party and the meaning
of his words; (2) the distinction between various standards
of meaning, i. e. individual, mutual, and customary meaning.
(i) The distinction between "intention" and "meaning"
(quite apart from any dispute as to the propriety of these
names) is vital. Interpretation as a legal process is concerned
with the meaning of words and not with the intention of the
one using them.' It is commonly said, as explaining the pro-
v. Dunn, 57 N. J. L. 404; Libby v. Land Co. (N. H.), 32 At. 772; Hank-
inson v. Vantine, 152 N. Y. 20; Johnson v. Portwood, 89 Tex. 235; Signa
Iron Co. v. Greeve, U. S. App., 88 Fed. 207.
1 This distinction and the above canon, insisted upon by many judges
(e.g. Lord Denman, C. J., in Rickman v. Carstairs, 5 B. & Ad. 663:
" The question . . . is not what was the intention of the parties, but
what is the meaning of the words they have used") and by Sir J. Wig-
ram, in his treatise on "B Extrinsic Evidence in Aid of the Interpretation
of Wills," has been acutely and strenuously denied by F. V. Hawkins,
Esq., in his paper "On the Principles of Legal Interpretation (2 Jurid.
Soc. Papers, 298 ; reprinted in Professor Thayer's "Preliminary Treatise
on Evidence," App. C); Mr. Hawkins calls the above principle "a fal-
lacy of no small importance," since interpretation is mainly "a collect-
ing of the intent from all available signs or marks." Nevertheless, it
would be possible to show that the fallacy, on the contrary, lies in not
recognizing this principle; and its recognition seems to enable us better
to understand the actual rules of law; see the discussions in Leonhard,
Das Irrthum bei nichtigen Vertragen, referred to ante, 2.
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cess, that the words are symbols, and that the object of inter-
pretation is to ascertain the meaning of the symbols. But it
is here still open to believe that in ascertaining the "meaning."
of the symbols we are endeavoring to ascertain the state of
the party's mind as fixed upon certain objects; and we are
thus relegated once more to his mental condition as the ulti-
mate object of the investigation. This mode of defining the
process is likely to mislead' because the private intent of the
party is constantly found to be excluded by the law from con-
sideration, and it is difficult to reconcile this prohibition with
the theory that interpretation aims ultimately to ascertain in-
tention. Perhaps a better notion of the distinction between
intent and the meaning of words may be obtained frbm the
analogy of other illustrations. Suppose a vessel coasting the
shore and entering various harbors where the government
maintains a uniform system of harbor-buoys of various colors
and shapes, indicating respectively channels, sandbars, sunken
rocks, and safe anchorages; here the significance of each kind
of buoy is known to be the same in every harbor under gov-
ernment control. But suppose the vessel to enter a harbor or
inlet under the control of an individual or a city having a
peculiar and different code of usage for the buoys; here it is
immaterial whether a red buoy under the government system
signifies a channel or a sandbar; the vital question for the
vessel now is what a red buoy signifies under the code of the
local authority, and all other systems of meaning are thrown
aside as useless. This illustrates that though, in interpreting
a party's (e. g. a testator's) words, we are concerned with his
individual meaning, as distinguished from the customary sense
of words, still we are not dealing with his. state of mind, but
with the associations affixed by him to an expressed symbol
as indicating to others an external object. That is to say, the
local harbor authorities may have "intended" to put a green
buoy instead of a red buoy, or to have put the red buoy at
another spot, just as the testator may have intended to use
other words; but in both cases the state of mind as to intcn-
tion is a wholly different thing from the fixed association,
according to that individual's standard, between the expressed
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symbol and some external object. To illustrate another
aspect of the subject, suppose a game, e. g. of chess, to be
played by B with his guest A. If the two are of the same
nation, their standards-e. g. as to the shape of each chess-
man, the allowable moves, and the effect of a move-will be
the same. But some nations differ from others in one or
more of these respects; so that if, for example, B's national
rules allowed a rook to threaten diagonally on the board, A
as guest would accept and accommodate himself, as best he
might, to this standard of operation. But, though this much
might be conceded to B as host, in the adoption of his stand-
ards for giving effect or meaning to his acts of moving the
chessmen, yet it would remain true that his private intent or
state of mind, as distinguished from the significance of his
acts of moving, would be immaterial; so that, for example,
his intent to have touched and moved a different piece, or to
have placed the piece on a different square, would not be taken
into consideration. In the same way, the process of interpre-
tation may concern itself with the individual significance of a
testator's words as associated by his standards with specific
objects, but it may at the same time refuse to concern itself
with the state of mind that led up to the use of those words.1
On the one hand, then, is to be noted the distinction between
"intention " (or state of mind at the time of acting) and
"meaning" (or the association between specific words and ex-
ternal objects). The process of interpretation may best be
thought of as the tracing and ascertainment of this association.
(2) In this process of ascertainment, whose standard of
meaning shall be taken? The standards may be different, ac-
cording as the transaction is a unilateral or a bilateral one.
Where effect is to be given to the act of a single person-for
example, a testator-there is no reason why his individual
standard of usage should not be employed; for example, if
he names a house on " Maple Place," the words are to be
applied to the locality habitually associated by him with that
The law might conceivably choose to give effect to the intention; it
does rarely, as in the case of reformation for mutual mistake; why it
usually does not is noted in the next section.
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term, even though that locality is commonly designated as
"Maple Street."' But if the transaction is one in which another
person has shared (as a deed or contract) so that the other
person has acted on the faith of a certain meaning t6 the
words, then the standard must be enlarged; it is not to be the
individual standard of the first party, but the standard which
the other party was reasonably justified in acting. upon,-pri-
marily and usually, the standard common to other persons
generally, but, secondarily and peculiarly, the particular
standard of the second party, if that should differ from the'
standard of the community and still be a reasonable one. It
follows (I) that the individual meaning or sense used by the
first party alone is in itself immaterial ;2 (2) that the iense to
be taken is that which the other party was by universal usage
in the community justified in attributing to the words; (3).
that provided both parties are acquainted with a special (usu-
ally a commercial) usage, which would naturally apply to the
case in hand, the term may be interpreted according to that
special usage ;3 (4) that where the first party employs the
term in an individual sense, which differs from the general
sense, but is nevertheless known to the second party to be at-
tached to the term, the second party is not entitled to invoke
the general standard, but must be content with an enforce-
ment according to this individual sense.
4
§ Io. Same: General Principle of Interpretat'on. In thi.s
process of ascertaining the association between specific words,
as used by the person acting, and external objects, a large
' For the supposed rule against disturbing a clear meaning, see
post, . 12.
2Fox v. R. Co. v,. Conn., 38 Atl. 871 ; Gamble' v. Mfg. Co., 50 Nebr.
463; Rickerson v. Ins. Co., i49 N. Y. 307; Fudge v. Payne, 86 Va. 306;
Anderson v. Jarrett, 43 W. Va. 246. The case of an ambiguity, in which
each party's sense is a reasonable one (Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 2 H. & C.
906, "ex Peerless" ), rests on peculiar grounds.
3 See Armstrong v. Granite Co. (Ill.), 42 N. E. 186; Eaton v. Gladwell,
zo8 Mich. 678; Rickerson v. Ins. Co., r49 N. Y. 307. These cases illus-
trate that the usage must be in f'ct known to the other party, or so gen-
eral that it was probably known to him.
'For the application here of the supposed rule against disturbing a
clear meaning, seepost, . 12.
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field of investigation is opened. So far as concerns the impli-
cations of the process itself, it is natural, and it may be ac-
cept d as a legal principle, that all sources of information.
should be consulted. The -circumstances amid which the
person lived and acted, his usages as to words and phrases,.
his conduct and expressions, may all furnish data throwing,
light upon his association of specific objects with specific
words and phrases,-i. e. upon the meaning of such words
and phrases. "To understand the meaning of any writer we-
must first be apprised of the persons and circumstances that
are the subject of his allusions or statements; and if these are
not fully disclosed in his work, we must look for illustration,
to the history of the times in which he wrote, and to the
works of contemporaneous authors. All the facts and cir-
cumstances, therefore, respecting persons or property to
which the will relates, are undoubtedly legitimate, and often:
necessary evidence, to enable us to understand the meaning
and application of his words."' "The court has a right to.
ascertain all the facts which were known to the testator at the-
time he made the will, and thus to place itself in the testator's
position, in order to ascertain the bearing and application of
the language which he uses, and in order to ascertain whether
there exists any person or thing to which the whole descrip-
tion given in the will can be, reasonably and with sufficient
certainty, applied." 2  "To get at the intention expressed by
the will, . . . as a will must necessarily apply to persons and
things external, any evidence may be given of facts and cir-
cumstances which have any tendency to give effect and opera-
tion to the will-such as the names, descriptions and designa-
tions of persons, the relations in which they stood to the
testator, the facts of his life, as having been single or married
one or more times, having had children by one or more wives,
their names, ages, places of residence, occupations; so of
grandchildren, brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, and
all similar facts; and the same kind of evidence may be given
of all facts and circumstances attending the property be-
1 Lord Abinger, C. B., in Doe v. Hiscocks, 5 M. & W. 363.
2 Lord Cairns, L. C., in Charter v. Charter,. L. R. 7 H. L. 364.
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,queathed, its name, place and description, as by its former
owner, present occupant, or otherwise."'  " The general rule
is that in construing a will the court is entitled to put itself
into the position of the testator, and to consider all material
facts and circumstances known to the testator with reference
to which he is to be taken to have used the words in the
will."'2
There is thus, so far as the natural suggestions of the pro-
cess of interpretation are concerned, a "free and full range
among extrinsic facts in aid of interpretation." But are there .
any limitations upon this range of search, other than the ordi-
nary rules as to the admissibility of evidence ? It is not easy
to trace and distinguish the various elusive shapes taken by
certain supposed rules of limitation. But those that have, in
one shape or another, received effect, correctly or incorrectly,
seem reducible to three general rules: (i) a rule against using
declarations of intention; (2) a rule against disturbing a
clear meaning, and (3) a rule against correcting a false de-
scription.
4
§ i i. Same: (I) Rule against using Declarations of Inten-
tion. An established rule, never questioned, is that, for the
purpose of interpretation, declarations of intention are not to
be consulted. The reason is not that such declarations can-
1 Shaw, C. J., in Tucker v. Seaman's Aid Society, 7 Met. z88.
2 Blackburn, J., in Allgood v. Blake, L. R. 8 Ex. x6o.
3 Thayer, Preliminary Treatise, 414.
4 Nothing will here be said about Lord Bacon's distinction (ante,
J 297) between "patent" and "latent" ambiguities; this "unprofitable
subtlety" which "still performs a great and confusing function in our
legal discussions," in spite of the repeated exposures of its inutility
as a working rule, has been fully disposed of-in Professor Thayer's
"Preliminary Treatise," pp. 422, 47r.
The limitations noted ante, 9, as to employing usage to interpret con-
tracts' or deeds, are to be understood as additional to those above men-
tioned; but they do not flow from the nature of data that may be con-
sulted, so much as from the standard controlling the entire process of
interpretation. Where a unilateral act is to be interpreted, the standard
or object is the sense employed by the single actor; where a bilateral act
is to be interpreted, the standard is primarily the joint sense of the two
parties; and the special limitations applicable in the latter case are thus
outside of and preliminary to the further limitations now to be noted.
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not throw light upon the application of the words; for they
might conceivably do so; but that their. chief and overshad-
owing function and effect would be to set up a rival declara-
tion of volition, coming directly into competition with the
words of the document which alone is to be regarded as the
legal act. Thus, where a will provides for a bequest of the
testator's library to his cousin James, an oral declaration of
his "I want my nephew William to have my library," while
conceivably it might with other facts help out a disputed in-
terpretation, would be likely to have the paramount effect, if
considered, of overturning the words of the will and substi-
tuting, as that part of the testamentary act, a declaration not
in itself available as a testamentary act; in other words, it
violates the rule of Integration already examined.'
To this rule of limitation there is one exception well set-
'In the case of wills, such declarations are excluded "upon this plain
ground, because his will ought to be made in writing" (Lord Abinger,
C. B., in Doe v. Hiscocks, 5 M. & W. 363; so also Shaw, C. J., in Tucker
v. Seaman's Aid Society, 7 Met. 188) ; in the case of contracts and deeds,
because the parties by intention made the writing the sole memorial of
the act, and further, because one party's intention or sense is immaterial.
If we could suppose that a will were not required to be in writing and
signed, it would seem that various declarations of testamentary intention
might be consulted for the purpose of determining which was the ef-
fective testamentary act and what its tenor. Moreover, wherever the
actual intent or state of mind may, by the Integration rule, be looked to
for the purpose of invalidating or reforming a supposed act (as in reform-
ation of a deed for mutual mistake-ante, 3--or in those cases where a
testator's mistake as to the contents of a will may be shown-ante, 3),
it would seem that declarations of intention could be considered. So
that the exclusion of such declarations in the process of interpretation
seems to be explainable, not as a rule of evidence affecting interpreta-
tion, but as the consequence of the rule, already treated, about integra-
tion or parol-evidence. Professor Thayer has expressed the view (Pre-
liminary Treatise, 414) that it is "usually and rightly regarded as an
excluding rule of evidence ;" though he elsewhere (p. 144) concedes
that it "partakes of the character of both" a rule of evidence and a rule
of construction; yet the suggestion of Lord Abinger, supra, that it is a
consequence of the general rule excluding utterances which compete
with the writing, seems preferable.
Distinguish the use of ante-testamentary declarations of a testator as
showing the probable contents of the will as ultimately executed; here
there is no attempt at interpretation nor at setting up declarations to
compete with conceded contents.
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tled, and another once prevailing but now generally repudiated.
(a) Where an object is described in terms equally applicable
to two or more objects, the testator's declarations specifying
the particular one signified are admissible; as in the often-:used
illustration, if one devise his manor of S. to A. B., and he has
two manors, North S. and South S., "it being clear that he
means to devise one only, whereas both are equally denoted
by the words he has used."' This is the situation ordinarily
known as ,equivocation;" 2 and the exception is unquestioned.
3
The same principle may be applied to contracts and deeds, so
as to admit the understanding of the parties, though ex-
pressed independently of the document, as to the appli-
cation of ambiguous words or phrases.4 (a') Where a blank
occurs, the exception does not ordinarily apply to admit such
declarations; because the blank will usually indicate a delib-
erate non-exercise of testamentary or contractual action on
that subject in the document, and so the use of other declara-
tions to supply the blank- would in effect violate the rule of
integration, already described, requiring the terms of the act
'Bacon's Maxims, R. 25; Lord Abinger, C. B., in Doe v. Hiscocks, 5
M. & W. 363.
2 Here the declarations are not obnoxious to the parol-evidence orinte-
gration rule, because they do not compete for effect with any terms of the
writing, and thus their interpretative force, as showing the significance
of the words "manor of S.," can be given full play without the danger
of contravening that rule; this is the explanation of Parke, B., in Doe
v. Needs, 2 M. & W. 129: "The words of the will do describe the object
or subject intended; and the evidence of the declarations of the testator
has not the effect of varying the instrument in any way whatever; it
only enables the court to reject one of the subjects or objects to which
the description in the will applies and to determine which of the two the
devisor understood to be signified by the description which he used in
the will ;" see the same language adopted by Bigelow, C. J., in Bodman
v. American Tract Society, 9 AlL 447.
3 The Lord Cheney's Case, 5 Co. 68 b (on a devise "to his son John
generally," it might be shown "that he, at the time of the will made,
named his son John the younger."
IDiggs v. Kurtz, 132 Mo. 250 (deed of "lot No. 312," nOt naming
boundaries or plat; oral agreement admitted); Maynard v. Render
(Ga.), 23 S. R. 194 ("cords" of wood; mutual understanding as to a
cord's length admitted).
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to be sought in the written memorial alone.1 But where the
blank indicates merely the party's ignorance of the complete
desciiption and not a failure to make a definite act or transfer,
the situation is the ordinary one of an equivocation (a"l)
Where a gift is to one or more than one of a class, the situation
may be equivalent to that of a blank-e.g., a devise to "A and B
and heirs," or to "one of the sons of C," or to " my nephew
D or E ; " for here there is a failure to complete the testa-
mentary disposition:' But, on the other hand, it may be in
effect a definite disposition giving an election to some donee to
choose out of a class of objects; here the gift is not void for
uncertainty. 4 (b) Where the terms of the will are not appli-
cable to any object, i. e. where the description " is true in part
but not true in every particular-as where an estate is dev'ised
called A, and is described as in the occupation of B, and it is
found that though there is an estate called A, yet the whole
is not in B's occupation, or where an estate is devised to a
person whose surname or whose Christian name is mistaken, or
1 In the following instances the declarations were not admitted: Hunt
v. Hort, 3 Prec. Ch. 3rx ("to become the property of Lady ");
Baylis v. Attorney-General, 2 Atk. 237 (money given "according to Mr.
-- his will"). It may be noted that this situation may occur even
where the document does not contain what could be termed literally a
blank; for example, where a will contained a list of devisees indicated
by successive letters, K, L, M, etc., and provided that "the key and
index to initials is in my writing-desk," but the key to the cipher was
dated eight years later than the will; this was excluded, because the will
was in effect unfinished when executed, and the subsequent key was not
a valid testamentary act. On this principle the following case may be
questionable: Dennis v. Holsapple, 148 Ind. 297; devise to "whoever
shall take care of me and maintain, nurse, clothe and furnish me, etc.,
during the time of life yet when I shall need the same ;" the claimant
was allowed to show that she fulfilled this description, and that the tes-
tatrix had in asking her aid, referred to the above provision.
2 This was the case in the following instances: Price v'. Page, 4 Ves.
Jr. 679 (bequest to " Price, the son of Price"); Marske v.
Willard, 169 I. 276 (lease of "lot No. - , in assessor's subdivision of
Whiting's Block, No. 8").
3 Altham's Case. 8 Co. 155; Strode v. Russell, 2 Vern. 621.
4 Bacon, Maxims, Rule 25 ; thou,- - it would apparently not be a case
of equivocation where declarations could be used.
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whose description is imperfect or inaccurate,"' there seems no
reason against using declarations of intention; because their
effect is not to compete with the -terms of the will, but merely
to aid in determining which is the essential part of the de-
scription and which the non-essential part. The description
had a definite sense for the testator, but some part of it has to
yield, being inaccurate, and the only effect of the declarations
can be to aid in applying the description as used by the tes-
tator. That declarations of intention are in such a case ad-
missible, may fairly be said to have been once the law in
England; 2 but subsequent rulings have rejected such evi-




'Tindal, C. J., in Miller v. Travers, 8 Bing. 244.
2 Thomas v. Thomas, 6 T. R. 671 ("to my granddaughter, Mary
Thomas, of L., in M. parish;" there was *an M. T., but she was a great-
granddaughter, and lived in another parish; there was an E. E., who
was a granddaughter and lived in M. parish; declarations of intent
made at the time of execution were held admissible); Selwood v. Mild-
may, 3 Ves. Jr. 306 (bequest of stock "in the four per cent. annuities of
the Bank of England ;" the testator had only long annuities not four
per cents; instructions to his attorney admitted); Still v. Hoste, 6 Madd.
192 (bequest to "Sophia S., daughter of P. S. ;" P. S. had daughters,
but none named Sophia; instructions to scrivener admitted); Tindal, C.
J., in Miller v. Travers, quoted suira.
3 Doe v. Hiscocks, 5 M. & W. 363 (to "my grandson, J. H., eldest son
of the said J. H. ;" J. H., the father, had a son S., the eldest by his first
wife, and a son J. H., the eldest by his second wife; instructions and
declarations excluded, almost solely on the authority of Miller v. Travers,
suepra; the decision thus rests on a direct misunderstanding) ; Bernasconi
v. Atkinson, xo Hare 345 (following Doe v. Hiscocks) ; Drake v. Drake, 8
H. L. C. 172, 175 (resting solely on Doe v. Hiscocks) ; Charter v. Charter,
L. R. 7 H. L. 364 (by three judges; but Lord Selborne, one of them,
added, "Why the law should be so . . . I am not sure that I clearly un-
derstand ;" the preceding cases were held to control). Professor Thayer,
Preliminary Treatise, 480, accepts this result as sound.
IThe question has not often been discussed because of a tendency to
ignore the distinction between declarations of intention and other evi-
dence; admitted: Covert v. Sebern, 73 Ia. 564; Lassing v. James, 1o7
Cal. 348; Gordon v. Burris, 141 Mo. 602; excluded: Eckford v. Eckford
(Ia.), 53 N. W. 344; Judy v. Gilbert, 77 Ind. 96; Funk v. Davis, 122 id.
28r; Rhrman v. Hoskins, S7 Miss. 192.
